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cient justification for prohibiting almost all roadway advertising." In
Mitchell there is the added factor of shock to some drivers caused by
the word "abortion."
The Mitchell court's objection to the breadth of the regulation was
also debatable. Instead of judging the ordinance by the type of abortion
information proscribed,79 the court should have noted that the only
medium regulated was the billboard. This introduces the final considera-
tion which demonstrates the probable constitutionality of the ordinance.
As billboard advertising was the only medium the plaintiff was prohib-
ited from using, he had many alternative means of communicating his
information. The newspaper appears to be the most suitable, although
radio and television are plausible. Mr. Mitchell might even be able to
follow in the illustrious, and apparently immortal, footsteps of F.J.
Chrestensen and disseminate his message by handbill.
JOHN MICHAEL KoPs
Consumer Protection-Truth-In-Lending Disclosures Not Timely at
Closing
Recognizing that the American consumer was faced with inconsist-
ent and noncomparable credit disclosure practices which were causing
confusion about credit,' Congress enacted Title I (Truth in Lending) of
the Consumer Credit Protection Act (the Act),2 which became effective
July 1, 1969. 3 The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
(the Board) was granted the power of prescribing regulations4 for the
Act. The implementing regulation, known as Regulation Z,5 became
7 See Markham Advertising Co. v. State, 73 Wash. 2d 405, 415-16, 439 P.2d 248, 254-55
(1968) (summary of expert testimony concerning the effect of billboards on highway safety).
79335 F. Supp. at 741-42.
IS. REP. No. 392, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 1 (1967).
'Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601-81 (1970).
'Pub. L. No. 90-321, § 504(b), 82 Stat. 167.
'Truth in Lending Act § 105, 15 U.S.C. § 1604 (1970):
The Board shall prescribe regulations to carry out the purposes of this subchapter.
These regulations may contain such classifications, differentiations, or other provisions,
and may provide for such adjustments and exceptions for any class of transactions, as
in the judgment of the Board are necessary or proper to effectuate the purposes of this
subchapter, to prevent circumvention or evasion thereof, or to facilitate compliance
therewith.
512 C.F.R. § 226 (1971).
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effective on the same date. The major thrust of the Act is in the direction
of disclosure. So that meaningful disclosures might be made at the
critical stages in credit fransactions, the Act and Regulation Z seek to
require appropriate disclosure with attention to the procedural and me-
chanical differences in the types of credit in use today.
The Act initially divides credit between "open-end credit"' and
"credit other than open-end." Regulation Z further divides "credit other
than open-end" into "credit sales" and "loans and other nonsale
credit."7 These categories are critical to the requirements of the Act, for
the extent to which disclosures must be made depends upon the classifi-
cation of the transaction.' In the disclosure requirements for home fi-
nancing, the classification "loans and other non-sale credit" encompas-
ses the majority of home financing transactions which involve a seller,
a buyer-mortgagor, and a mortgagee. The mortgagee qualifies as a
"creditor" 9 and thereby becomes subject to the provisions of the Act.
Regulation Z sets out in great detail the disclosures required with first
mortgage loans for residential dwellings. 0
Since the most significant stage of a consumer loan is the point at
which the consumer becomes obligated to the lender, the Act requires
disclosures before the purchaser of credit enters into an obligation."
Section 1639(b) of the Act states that "disclosure shall be made before
-12 C.F.R. § 226.2(r) (1971).
"Open end credit" means consumer credit extended on an account pursuant to a
plan under which (1) the creditor may permit the customer to make purchases or obtain
loans, from time to time, directly from the creditor or indirectly by use of a credit card,
check, or other device, as the plan may provide; (2) the customer has the privilege of
paying the balance in full or in installments; and (3) a finance charge may be computed
by the creditor from time to time on an outstanding unpaid balance. The term does not
include negotiated advances under an open end real estate mortgage or a letter of credit.
7Jensen, Effect of Federal Truth in Lending Act and Regulation Z on Real Estate, 4 REAL
PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 11, 21 (1969).
'Kintner, Henneberger, & Neill, A Primer on Truth-in-Lending, 13 ST. Louis U.L.J. 501,527
(1969).
'12 C.F.R. § 226.2(m) (1971).
1012 C.F.R. 4§ 226.8(b)(l)-(7), (d)(l)-(3) (1971) contain all the disclosures that must be made
in a mortgage loan transaction. Some of the more important items are: (1) date at which finance
charge begins to accrue, (2) total finance charge as an annual percentage rate (12
C.F.R. § 226.4(a) (1971) points out that the finance charge includes all charges payable as an
"incident tn or a condition of the extension of credit" such as interest, service charges, points, loan
fee, credit reports, appraisal fees), (3) number, amount, and due dates of payments, (4) amount of
any charges for lateness, (5) description of security interest, and (6) amount of credit. It is notewor-
thy that in 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.8(b)(3), (d)(3) (1971) the lender is exempted from two important
disclosures: the total sum of the payments and the total amount of the finance charge.
"Kintner, Henneberger, & Neill, supra note 8, at 516.
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the credit is extended."'" Regulation Z extends this provision by specify-
ing that disclosure "shall be made before the transaction is consum-
mated."' 3 While the Board has advised lenders and creditors on the
proper interpretation of the disclosure time provision under the "loan
and other non-sale credit" section," the courts have had no opportunity
until Bissette v. Colonial Mortgage Corp.5 to consider this provision of
the Act or to review the interpretation of it rendered by the Board in
Regulation Z. This note will examine Bissette on two levels. First, the
court's interpretation of the Act will be analyzed with reference to
accepted doctrines of statutory construction. The note will conclude by
considering the wisdom of the Bissette decision in terms of the policies
it seeks to promote in the area of financial consumer protection.
In Bissette plaintiffs entered into an agreement with a seller to
purchase a family dwelling, the agreement being contingent upon their
obtaining satisfactory financing. Plaintiffs then met with defendant,
Colonial Mortgage Corporation, to file an application for Federal
Housing Administration (FHA) financing. At a later time plaintiffs
were informed by defendant that FHA approval had been obtained, but
defendant made none of the required disclosures until closing, one
month later." The Bissettes brought suit for damages under section 1640
of the Act claiming that disclosure of the credit information at closing
is not timely because it comes too late to satisfy the purposes of the
Act. 7 Upon cross-motions for summary judgment, the court held that
"Truth in Lending disclosures made only at closing frustrate the Con-
"2Truth in Lending Act § 129(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1639(b) (1970).
1312 C.F.R. § 226.8(a) (1971).
"In Letter from Milton W. Schober, Assistant Director of FRB, Feb. 1I, 1970, in 4 CCH
CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE 30,281 (1972), the Board informed lenders that consummation refers
to a contractual relationship and that disclosure only need be made prior to consummation.
"340 F. Supp. 1191 (D.D.C. 1972). This case has been appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit.
"$The fact that plaintiffs entered into a pre-possession agreement with the seller after notifica-
tion of FHA approval, and moved into the house 21 days before closing should be noted, as it
seems to be significant in the court's resolution of the case. 340 F. Supp. at 1192.
"Truth in Lending Act § 102, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1970):
The Congress finds that economic stabilization would be enhanced and the competi-
tion among the various financial institutions and other firms engaged in the extension
of consumer credit would be strengthened by the informed use of credit. The informed
use of credit results from an awareness of the cost thereof by consumers. It is the purpose
of this subehapter to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer
will be able to compare more readily the various credit terms available to him and avoid
the uninformed use of credit.
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gressional intent and basic purpose of the Act, and as such, constitute
a violation thereof."' 8
Defendant argued that the language in the first subsection of sec-
tion 1639(b) of the Act, that disclosure "shall be made before the credit
is extended," 9 should be read to mean "any time" before credit is
extended.2 The court discarded this first contention by referring to the
legislative intent of providing information in time to compare alterna-
tives." In citing this legislative goal as the reason for denying acceptance
of defendant's interpretation, the court assumed that disclosure at "any
time" before credit is extended would negate the possibility of credit
comparison. In addition to relying upon this debatable assumption, the
court deviated from many accepted doctrines of statutory construction
in interpreting section 1639(b).
As early as 1854, Lord Coke formulated rules of legislative inter-
pretation which today remain as the most reliable guide to proper judi-
cial use of statutes.22 In Heydon's Case,2 after enumerating four fac-
tors to be considered in gaining a true interpretation of statutes, Lord
Coke suggested that statutes be given such "construction as shall sup-
press the mischief, and advance the remedy, and . . . suppress subtle
inventions and evasions for continuance of the michief . . . and...
add force and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent
of the makers of the Act. .... "24 While Bissette strives to suppress the
mischief of the "uninformed use of credit,"25 the decision fails to ad-
vance the remedy which the legislature "resolved and appointed to cure
the disease. 218
11340 F. Supp. at 1194.
'Truth in Lending Act § 129(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1639(b) (1970).
2340 F. Supp. at 1193.
211d.
212 J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 4501 (3d ed. F. Horack
1943).
23 Co. Rep. 7a, 7b, 76 Eng. Rep. 637, 638 (Ex. 1584) (footnotes omitted):
And it was resolved by them, that for the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in
general . . . four things are to be discerned and considered:-
1st. What was the common law before the making of the Act.
2nd. What was the mischief and defect for which the common la"N did not
provide.
3rd. What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the
disease of the commonwealth.
And, 4th. The true reason of the remedy. . ..
241d.
21Truth in Lending Act § 102, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1970); 12 C.F.R. 226.1(a)(2) (1971); see
H.R. REP. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 18 (1967).
2 Heydon's Case, 3 Co. Rep. 7a, 7b, 76 Eng. Rep. 637, 638 (Ex. 1584).
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To overcome the problem of the uninformed use of credit, Congress
provided a remedy of disclosure. The court's reading of section 1639(b),
however, overlooks the legislative intent as to how the remedy should
be applied. Congress has made it clear that the Act and its remedy of
disclosure should be carried out according to the dictates of the Board"7
as related through Regulation Z. In making an interpretation of section
1639(b) contrary to that urged by defendant, the court shunned the
interpretation of the body which Congress clearly appointed to direct
the implementation of the Act. 8 The Board has spoken unmistakably
on the meaning of the words in section 1639(b). In addition to the use
of the phrase "before the transaction is consummated" in Regulation
Z,29 the Board has also given assurance that "consummation" refers to
a contractual relationship between the extender of credit and the cus-
tomer. 0 More specific to the contention of defendant, the Board has
implied that disclosure any time before consummation is acceptable by
stating that the only requirement is that the disclosure be made prior
to the contractual relationship." In Bissette, the court's decision proba-
bly resulted from an opinion that less preference should be given the
interpretations of a regulatory agency than the court's own determina-
tion of legislative intent. Recognizing that application of law according
to the spirit of the legislative body must always be the foremost objec-
tive,32 the court was faced with a dilemma as to which spirit to honor:
the one calling for authority in the regulatory body or the broader
congressional spirit of meaningful disclosure?
Colonial Mortgage also argued that the last subsection of section
1639(b), which permits disclosure to "be made by disclosing the infor-
71Truth in Lending Act § 105, 15 U.S.C. § 1604 (1970).
2l'he weight which Congress intended the interpretations of the Board to carry can be seen in
the following House Report:
All substantive regulations in connection with the full disclosure of the terms and condi-
tions of finance charges in credit transactions ... shall be issued by the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System. No one can deny their experience and exper-
tise in these matters. Accordingly, it is the view of your committee that, for uniformity
of application to all affected segments of the industries concerned, a single set of compre-
hensive regulations should be issued.
H.R. REP. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 18 (1967); see 15 U.S.C. § 1604 (1970).
-12 C.F.R. § 226.8(a) (1971).
"Letters from Milton W. Schober, Assistant Director of FRB, Aug. 27, 1969, in 4 CCH
CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE 30,146-47, at 66,060-61 (1972).
3 Letter from Milton W. Schober, Assistant Director of FRB, Feb. 11, 1970, in 4 CCH
CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE 1 30,281, at 66,132 (1972).
122 J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 22, § 4501.
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mation in the note or other evidence of indebtedness to be signed by the
obligor," should be read as allowing disclosure as late as the signing of
the note at closing.33 Basing its conclusion on "logic and the relevant
legislative history,"34 the court decreed that "the language relied upon
merely states how Truth in Lending information may be disclosed and
says nothing about when."35 As support for its interpretation, the court
cited the House Report36 accompanying the Act and deduced from the
report that the subsection of 1939(b) in question was intended "to facili-
tate compliance by making disclosure possible in a single instrument,
to a single obligor. '3 7 Legislative history and logic could have also led
the court toward defendant's point of view. Further inquiry into the
legislative history reveals the Senate Report on section 1639(b) which
discusses the last subsection under the heading Time of disclosure."8
This heading39 alone disproves the court's theory that the section of the
Act in question is not relevant to the time of disclosure. Furthermore,
the court's reply to defendant's contention is illogical. A provision which
permits disclosure in certain specific documents inevitably affects the
time for such disclosure. The time will be the time that the specified
document is routinely used. It is hard to imagine that Congress would
speak of documents upon which disclosure could be made, every docu-
ment mentioned being of a type that appears at the end of a credit
transaction, without intending to have some effect on time of disclosure.
The words of the statute, "evidence of indebtedness to be signed
by the obligor,"40 refer to a document giving rise to a contractual com-
mitment. The fact that Congress drafted section 1639(b) with words
dealing with the time of contractual commitment suggests that Congress
13340 F. Supp. at 1193.
31 d.
5Id.
38H.R. REP. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 25 (1967).
37340 F. Supp. at 1193.
'S. REP. No. 392, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 15 (1967): "Section 4(b)-The original of S. 5
required disclosure 'prior to the consummation of the transaction.' The committee bill substitutes
'before the credit is extended' with a stipulation that the disclosure can be made on the contract
or other document to be signed by the consumer. This obviates the need for a separate piece of
paper showing the disclosure items."
"It is recognized that only slight value is usually given section headings in construing the
words of a statute because of the possibility that they were inserted by a clerk only for reference
and because they are not essential parts of the act. E. CRAWFORD, THE CONSTRUCTION OF
STATUTES § 207 (1940). The same reasoning should hold true with congressional reports. While
headings might deserve little reliance when the question is legislative intent or the meaning of a
word, they obviously hold more value in revealing the subject area being discussed.
"°Truth in Lending Act § 129(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1639(b) (1970).
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felt this particular time to be crucial to the mortgage loan context. By
carefully providing for disclosure in a document which a consumer must
see before he becomes legally obligated, Congress communicated its
desire that disclosure be made before a contractual commitment is un-
dertaken. Consequently, defendant's disclosure at closing should have
been permissible as long as it preceded the borrower's signing of the
note. In refuting this second argument by defendant, the court over-
looked the Senate Report" and the Act's continual reference to points
of finality in the loan process.
Defendant also attempted to defend on the grounds of impractical-
ity of compliance with a pre-closing disclosure, arguing that all of the
information relative to closing costs would not then be available." The
court disposed of this argument by referring to provision 226.6(D of
Regulation Z, which allows for an estimate of unknown or unavailable
items when disclosure is made.43 The court's treatment of defendant's
argument" suffers because of the slight importance it attaches to the
plea of impracticality of compliance. The court seemed to adopt the
attitude that no court should be burdened with weighing the real prob-
lems of compliance. When section 226.6(D is applied, the resulting use
of estimates may lead to difficulties. Just as there are situations in which
the information is not available for an exact disclosure, there will also
be situations where the information upon which to base an estimate is
unavailable. This possibility would be greater if disclosure is required
near the beginning of a loan negotiation.
In many instances, the purposes of the Act45 will not be promoted
by the use of estimates because an estimate would not be "meaningful
disclosure" to a consumer. One percentage point difference in the rate
of interest can mean a great deal of money, so an estimate would often
be of little value. The widespread use of estimates would also provide
unscrupulous lenders the opportunity to take advantage of borrowers
who might depend heavily on an estimate only to be told the higher
percentage rate or dollar amount at closing.
41S. Rep. No. 392, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 1, 15 (1967).
11340 F. Supp. at 1193-94.
'312 C.F.R. § 226.6(f) (1971).
"Defendant's chances of impressing the court with the impracticality of requiring disclosure
prior to closing were lessened by the fact that evidence was presented with the complaint showing
that the required information was available to Colonial Mortgage well in advance of closing. 340
F. Supp. at 1194.
"Truth in Lending Act § 102, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1970).
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Finally, defendant urged that the ambiguity of the language, "be-
fore the credit is extended," in section 1639(b) does not lend itself to
any absolute rule as to time of disclosure. The court in essence agreed
with defendant and found it unnecessary to adopt an absolute rule as
to disclosure time. It simply said that disclosures made only at closing
are a violation of the Act. After declaring that the "sole issue presented
for determination is when such disclosure must be made,"4 the court
was unable to determine a point in time antecedent to closing as the
exact time when disclosure must be made. The administration of mort-
gage transactions varies among individual lenders4 7 so that determining
a precise pre-closing event as the legally correct time for disclosure is a
challenging task. In reaching its conclusion, the court found itself un-
suited to resolve the central issue before it, because it lacked the exper-
tise and everyday experience" in the field of mortgage finance.
In considering whether the Bissette decision actually promoted the
policy of meaningful disclosure,49 one must remember that the court
decided that disclosure at closing would be of no effective use to the
consumer." Bissette assumed that a borrower is committed when he
attends closing even though he may not have signed the contract.-1 In
assessing the wisdom of the assumption upon which Bissette rests, scru-
tiny of the practical setting of a loan closing is necessary. In Bissette,
plaintiffs had been living in their new home for three weeks,5 2 a fact
showing a commitment of time and money, such that they were unlikely
to rescind the transaction even if the credit terms varied from their
expectations. Such a situation has a possibility of abuse to the borrower.
Since the practice of occupying a home before a loan is closed is not
prevalent, the Bissette decision and its assumption of commitment prior
1340 F. Supp. at 1192.
"The techniques used to process a loan in the period between the initial meeting with the
borrower and the closing vary from lender to lender. Some lenders do not see the borrower until
closing. Some extend verbal loan approval. Some mail written commitments. The time period
between the first meeting and closing also varies, depending upon the urgency of the loan, the type
of institution the lender is, the type of security interest involved, etc.
"See H.R. REP. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 18 (1967).
"By referring to the legislative history, the court showed that "meaningful disclosure" is a
primary purpose of the Act. 340 F. Supp. at 1193.
0'340 F. Supp. at 1193.
"The court assumed that even though a contractual relationship might not yet exist, disclosure
at closing was too late for effective use by the consumer and left him no viable choice if he did not
like the terms revealed at closing. The court saw a practical commitment before a legal commit-
ment. See 340 F. Supp. at 1193.
5"Note 16 supra.
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to closing should be evaluated in the context of the typical approach to
closing where a contract has not yet been signed. In the typical situation
where the borrower does not occupy the dwelling prior to closing, the
borrower is not absolutely committed, but still lacks any real alterna-
tive. Often the borrower has invested time, effort, and money in bringing
the transaction to the point of closing. Even if faced with higher costs
at closing than expected, he is likely to be more anxious to secure the
loan and move into the new home than to begin the process anew.
The reaction of lenders to Bissette53 has been one of knowing what
the court said but not knowing its full impact. Lenders know that they
cannot disclose at closing but are not sure at what time prior to closing
disclosure must be made in order to be "meaningful." Lenders are
adopting various approaches to comply with Bissette. Many mortgage
bankers have begun using a ten-day rule, calling for the expiration of
ten business days between disclosure and closing. Other lenders rou-
tinely send disclosures along with written confirmation of loan approval
prior to closing. Whatever the particular practice adopted, lenders seem
apprehensive about making disclosure at any time close to closing.
While it would seem that the court's decision would impose a hardship
on the lenders because of the unavailability of some information prior
to closing, this has not been the case. Costs such as appraisal fees,
origination fee, FHA insurance premium, and title search fees are stan-
dard in most situations and are not likely to change in the interim
between disclosure and closing. A possible hardship to mortgage bank-
ers could occur in a situation where discount points54 are quoted during
a season of rapid fluctuation in interest rates in the national money
market. Discount points could change overnight, leaving the lender
"boxed in" at the lower yield with a resulting difficulty in marketing
his loan. Concern is also felt over the question of whether a borrower
can waive the undefined period which Bissette seems to demand between
disclosure and closing. There are occasions when a borrower desires to
close a loan as soon as possible. Those lenders who have adopted a ten-
day rule are wary of quick closings and look forward to a conclusive
answer.
The Bissette decision makes disclosure requirements more strin-
5'The author has interviewed various lenders to assess their reaction to and understanding of
Bissette and to examine the steps they have taken to comply with its ruling.
"'Discount points are charged by lenders and deducted in advance from a loan so that the
loan's yield will equal the present interest rate in the money market. This practice is prevalent
among mortgage bankers who finance FHA and VA loans which carry an interest ceiling.
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gent for residential mortgage transactions. It should be noted that the
other types of credit under the Act, particularly "open-end credit
plans," "credit sales," and loans not secured by a first lien on a dwelling,
are still ruled as to time of disclosure by reference to the time at which
a contract is consummated. Different treatment of residential mort-
gages can be justified because homes are more of a necessity than the
majority of items financed and also represent perhaps the largest invest-
ment a family will make. Whether in the future the time of contractual
obligation will be abandoned as a reference point for those types of
credit unaffected by Bissette depends upon whether a consumer is obli-
gated as a matter of fact prior to signing a contract. If he is, the logic
of Bissettel5 would compel a finding that disclosure at the time of execu-
tion of the contract was not meaningful. Such a finding would be un-
likely, though, as the procedures and formalities unique to mortgage
loan transactions which call for investments of time and money by a
borrower before an obligation is undertaken do not exist with other
kinds of credit such as car loans, revolving charge plans, and appliance
financing. In these situations it is unlikely that a consumer would be-
come so committed prior to entering into a contract that he has no
meaningful opportunity to reject the contract.
The court in Bissette strived to reach a just decision on the facts
before it. While straining accepted rules of statutory interpretation and
brushing aside the opinions of the regulating authority, the decision in
Bissette reflects the efforts of a court to assure consumers of disclosure
of credit terms at a time when they still have a choice of accepting or
rejecting the credit. The decision rests on an assumption of commitment
prior to contract, an assumption which may not be universal in its
application. The value of the holding can be questioned because of its
failure to provide a definitive answer to the question of when disclosure
must be made. The Federal Reserve Board has acted to fill this gap by
proposing an amendment to Regulation Z11 calling for disclosure ten
business days before closing. This proposed amendment goes far to
effectuate the goals of meaningful disclosure as discussed by the court."
MICHAEL H. GODWIN
"See note 51 supra; 340 F. Supp. at 1193.
,'Proposed Truth in Lending Reg. § 226.8(a), (q), 37 Fed. Reg. 15522 (1972). The Federal
Reserve Board proposed an amendment to Regulation Z which would require disclosure 10 busi-
ness days before closing in any transaction involving the purchase of a dwelling.
51340 F. Supp. at 1194: "so they can decide for themselves whether the charges are reasonable
and have the opportunity, if they wish, to compare that cost with other available credit arrange-
ments."
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